by James Spencer
A narrative has appeared of recent: should President Ali Abdullah Salih go as the People demand, then Yemen will lurch into Somali-like chaos, provide a haven for al-Qa'ida, and a launch point from which AQAP can attack the United States and her allies. Supporting a status quo candidate from the current, and compromised, political elite will do little to satisfy the myriad complaints of the regime's multiple violent opponents. Instead, the International Community must identify a candidate to replace President Salih. This candidate must achieve consensus on a range of systemic problems confronting the country, problems mostly due to the current regime's corrupt neglect. Should Yemenis achieve such consensus, terrorism and the other violent protest will disappear.
The author of the Chaos narrative is Ali Abdullah Salih – who has a personal interest in its perpetuation – but many pundits repeat it. With similar rote repetition of nuanced and comparative statements by US intelligence officials, Ali Abdullah Salih's line (that he – the 33-year Strong Man – is all that stands between current stability and Bombs Over Broadway) has gained acceptance.
Even the intensely rational SecDef Gates said "if that government collapses or is replaced by one that is dramatically more weak, then I think we'll face some additional challenges out of Yemen. There's no question about it. It's a real problem."
Director of the National Counter-Terrorism Center Michael Leitner preceded his remark that "I actually consider al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, with Awlaki as a leader within that organization, probably the most significant risk to the U.S. homeland." by saying "Al-Qaida, we believe, in Pakistan is at one of its weakest points in the past decade". He also caveated "I'm hesitant to rank them too carefully".
Reinforcing the President's PR campaign, have been claims of AQAP attacks. Too many have unquestioningly lapped these up; in fact, many of these incidents probably have little to do with al-Qa'ida: Ma'rib attacks are more likely tribal protests against Salih (the Abidah tribe are still feuding with the Government over the killing of one of their shaikhs in an airstrike); there is reporting of Government soldiers planting landmines against oil company vehicles in an attempt to increase fears of post-Salih chaos; and Opposition supporters have been labelled by the Government as terrorists. The most spectacular is the looting and explosion of an ammunition factory in Abyan, followed by the proclamation of an Islamic Emirate. This attack has been attributed variously to AQAP and to the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army, a terrorist group dismantled after its murder of Western tourists in December 1998. So how did it spring to fully operational capability after ten years? It probably didn't, but the Government implicated Gen Ali Muhsin (Salih's henchman turned recent rival) in a likely attempt to dredge up his murky past and discredit him as a potential successor in the eyes of Washington. And Salih's withdrawal of security forces and administration from the five restive provinces to the east was probably a planned move to give a flavour of future chaos to external consumers.
Were the President truly the bulwark against chaos and Islamist terrorism that he claims, then his 'ticking bomb' would have detonated, given the weakening of Salih's power over the last month. Unfortunately for him / fortunately for us, the reality is otherwise. Salih's record has, in fact, been distinctly patchy – both on cooperation with the US, and in preventing AQAP from exporting its attacks. Indeed, the President has often used al-Qa'ida in his power struggles with other groups in the country, variously cracking down or enabling the organization as his domestic situation demands. al-Qa'ida does not have a strong operational capacity in Yemen: its members likely number no more than a few hundred, it has no solid base of support amongst the population, and the tribal powers that be in Yemen are more than a match for al-Qa'ida were they not to feel (similar to Salih) that al-Qa'ida is a sometimes useful force to use against their own domestic opponents. Indeed, despite the Government's weakening position, AQAP has not gained in capability in Yemen. Were a way forward found that would address the various groups' legitimate grievances against the central government, the usefulness of al-Qa'ida would quickly diminish and its capabilities would be radically reduced.
While many pundits repeat the trope that the Government's writ runs thin outside the cities, they fail to note that the back-country is not lawless. Just as the US federal government may cease to function but the states and counties continue their work, so the tribes of Yemen – which have maintained their own minutemen militia, legal system and social security over centuries – have continued to function. This is not an isolated phenomenon, but occurs throughout Yemen.
In the Abyan town where the ammunition factory exploded and 'Al Qaeda' proclaimed an Islamic Emirate, "local tribesmen prevented the armed militias from looting a local cement factory owned by a Saudi businessman" (employment provider.) In Sa'ada, the Zaydi revivalists Huthis replaced the departed governor with Faris Mana'a, a senior shaikh of the Bakil confederation. In parts of restless Shabwa, Southern Movement militias have occupied police and army positions, and control swathes of the Province. In the neighbouring province, a National Hadhramaut Council has been established, and elected its officers. It will "ensure the security of the governorate and its people against any repercussions that may undermine social peace or pose a threat to people's lives, families, properties and social harmony."
Ali Abdullah Salih is not the State. The tribes have been and remain its constituent parts. As happened in Iraq, when al-Qa'ida interferes with the business of the tribes, they will lose (there have already been several such killings.) Once the rotting waters of the swamp are drained, new life can bloom in Yemen's Arab Spring. There are many issues to cause concern in Yemen, but a post-Salih haven for al-Qa'ida is unlikely to be one.
James Spencer is a retired infantry commander who specialised in low intensity conflict. He is a strategic analyst on the political, security and trade issues of the Middle East and North Africa.
