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Assessing the evolving role of maritime power: How does the Royal Navy fit into the overall Defence Strategy?
By Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, First Sea Lord
"Futurology" is big business nowadays; you can hardly read a newspaper or watch a news programme at the moment without being given the benefit of somebody's assessment of the next 12 months. Everything from house prices to the stock market, from the outcome of the Champions League to the likely design of Kate Middleton's wedding dress.
But have you noticed how relatively few people are prepared to step up to the mark and make predictions on the bigger and more long term issues? Such as the potential strategic and geopolitical landscape in the coming years, or the UK's defence and security needs for the future.
This is hardly surprising when you consider how rare it is for analysts and commentators to predict correctly the strategic shocks that end up dictating our security responses; the collapse of communism, 9/11, and the current situation across the Maghreb to name but a few. As Harold MacMillan once said, "Events, dear boy, events."
So, you might be left wondering how I can possibly make assessments on the evolving role of maritime power and the Royal Navy of the future.
In actual fact, as history so often reminds us, the characteristics of the maritime strategic environment and the attributes of maritime forces largely endure. Our longstanding economic dependency on the sea for global trade remains unchanged. And navies continue to provide critical access where national interests are significant, and vulnerable, at a time and place of political choosing.
Consequently, the Royal Navy's roles remain largely constant. Counter-piracy and disaster relief operations, for example, are nothing new; the Royal Navy was protecting British trading interests in the Indian Ocean in the 18th Century, and contributing to disaster relief operations around the world at the dawn of the 20th Century. In broad terms, we shall be doing tomorrow what we did yesterday.
I therefore believe that we can talk with a degree of confidence about the future. But to do so wisely, we must also understand the likely future strategic context and threats. So, what will our global security environment look like?
Well, there's no doubt that it's a dynamic one, as – in many ways – it always has been. But today perhaps, it's more dynamic than ever. Why? In large part because the conveyor belts of globalisation are – in all their forms – accelerating us closer and closer together.
We are globally connected. In 1995, there were 16 million web users around the world. Today that figure stands at more than 1.7 billion.
The integration of economies around the world is increasing too. The UN estimates that in 1990, the total amount of global investment overseas was $2 trillion. In 2008 that figure had risen to around $18 trillion.
Just as there are fiscal imperatives to build closer ties with more economic powers, so globally there is a requirement to build more bridges as power becomes distributed more widely – as the circle of international decision-making becomes more multi-lateral. The G8 has been replaced by the G20 as the main forum for international economic co-operation; NATO has increased to 28 members; and the EU now consists of 27 countries.
So if the last 20 years really are anything to go by, it follows that the next 20 years will, propelled by continuous globalisation, be characterised by rapid change and increasing global interdependence.
Combine this with, as some analysts suggest, the potential contributing causes of future insecurity – such as population increase; resource scarcity; a greater inequality of the distribution of wealth; the expanding role of the non-state actor, potentially wearing the trappings of statehood; and climate change, from which none of us are immune – and there is no doubt in my mind that the global security environment is, and will remain, a distinctly dynamic one – complex, multi-dimensional, uncertain.
Recognising this, the UK's recently written National Security Strategy concludes that, 'international terrorism, cyber attack, major natural hazards and international military crises are the amongst the highest priority risks for the UK' and, as such, 'the risk picture is likely to become increasingly diverse'. I think events over the last three months support these statements.
So how should the UK, as an outward looking, globally trading, island nation, respond to this future global security environment? Being an island brings enormous benefits in security terms, but it also brings particular vulnerabilities.
According to the Chamber of Shipping, 95% of UK trade by volume and 90% by value is carried by sea. We import much of the food and energy we consume; dependencies that are unlikely to change. We live in a 'just enough, just in time' economy, one in which many goods, raw materials and other commodities are warehoused at sea, in bulk and container ships. We are already hugely reliant on the free movement of maritime traffic – a dependency that is likely only to increase. If that flow of material is interrupted, there are implications across the board, and they are increasingly strategic.
This is why the National Security Strategy assesses that a short to medium term disruption to international supplies of resources essential to the UK is a priority risk. To be frank; security – and in particular security of the sea – underpins the global trade and commodity prices upon which, not only the UK, but the global economy depends. In other words, the security of the sea has the ability to affect our everyday life.
And potentially affect our everyday life fast. For while some of these security challenges that I have spoken of have always been with us in one form or another, I would suggest that what is new is the speed at which they can combine to engage our national interests. Indeed, the recent events in the Magreb – and Libya in particular – serve as a timely reminder for the UK Government, as well as other nations, that the capacity of world events to surprise even the best prepared of us, should not be underestimated.
Given all that, the principal challenge for the UK, as it is for most nations, is to secure our strategic interests – the security of our people, our economic well-being, our freedoms and our values – in a global environment that is not just increasingly complex, but one that is characterised by rapid and often unpredictable change.
Hence, the UK's recently formed National Security Council directed that the UK should adopt a strategic posture referred to as 'Adaptable Britain' : a security posture that best reflects the strategic realities for this island nation, whose military operations are essentially responsive and expeditionary in nature.
So what does all this mean for the Royal Navy of the future, for the Royal Navy of say 2025? It means that, just as we are now, the Royal Navy needs to be strategically flexible.
If the Royal Navy is to meet the future security challenges in an unpredictable, dynamic and interconnected world, then the Royal Navy must be three things. First, the Royal Navy must be operationally versatile – able, for example, to move effortlessly across the spectrum of conflict; from delivering humanitarian aid to conducting intervention operations. Second, the Royal Navy must be interoperable – in all environments as part of a joint, multi-national and multi-agency force. And third, the Royal Navy must be 'sized to do the job' – appropriately scaled to meet standing commitments and be able to respond to contingent tasks.
Just as I regard the nature of maritime power – essentially the ability to exert influence through the use of the sea – remaining a constant, so therefore I believe the roles of the Royal Navy will remain a constant.
In addition to providing and protecting the Continuous At Sea Deterrent – the UK's ultimate means to deter the most extreme threats in the longer term – the Royal Navy will have three mutually supporting core roles.
The first core role is projecting maritime power, or warfighting. Ultimately, the military provides the Government with the means to threaten or use force. The successful delivery of military power is directly dependent on our ability to intervene militarily with confidence. For you cannot deter effectively unless it is understood by those whose behaviours you seek to influence that you can act. You cannot keep the peace unless you are physically there, and prepared and able to stay there. By providing assured and operationally versatile warfighting capabilities the Royal Navy is able to operate either independently or as part of a joint or multi-national integrated force. The maritime environment enables swift military deployment, early sustained presence and the ability to switch rapidly between military, diplomatic and humanitarian tasking.
Just as we have witnessed recently with Libya. From the initial extraction of British and other nationals, to the effective ongoing maintenance of the arms embargo and a no-fly zone in support of UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973. This crisis is a timely reminder of the inherent utility of a 'flexible Navy'; from NEO to the delivery of precision strike.
The second role is that of maritime security. Delivering maritime security is required to protect UK citizens, territory, and trade from terrorists, criminals (such as drug and people traffickers), piracy, state sponsored insurgents and unlawful restrictions on freedom of navigation. Maximum effect is achieved by taking a preventative approach, leading and working with partner Navies. This requires sufficient platforms which have the capability to conduct maritime interdiction operations whilst remaining self sustaining, resilient and interoperable with other nations. Much as we do now, routinely working alongside the Serious Organised Crime Agency, Revenue and Customs, DEFRA, DFID and international law enforcement and Humanitarian Aid agencies worldwide. But I sense that the global appetite for maritime security will only increase in our uncertain future.
Third, maritime engagement. The access enabled by the maritime environment provides the Royal Navy with unique opportunities to promote UK interests. Persistent maritime presence develops trust and stable relationships between states, reassures allies and develops strategic understanding. More direct engagement can assist in security sector reform, the building of a partner nation's maritime capacity and delivery of humanitarian aid and disaster relief. Engagement is a powerful tool in delivering longer term conflict prevention in support of a broader 'whole of government' approach.
After all, no nation can achieve its aims and meet the needs of its national security, acting in isolation. That is why, for example, we in the UK have taken decisions to make the new Carriers more able to operate with our partners and why we have agreed with the French to collaborate further in the maritime domain. For collaborative working is one area where we can all leverage effect to our mutual benefit, both operationally through the sharing of intelligence and resources, but also strategically, in setting the conditions for stability. Time spent forging links is seldom wasted. As I often say, you can surge forces, but you can't surge trust.
Common to all three mutually supporting core roles are the needs to be operationally versatile, interoperable and appropriately scaled. So how are we going to enable these three core roles that ultimately give the Royal Navy its vital strategic flexibility?
Well it means that the Royal Navy continues to demand, amongst other things, technologically capable platforms and competent, innovative people.
Let's take platforms first. As the Secretary of State said in December, "the United Kingdom needs a powerful Royal Navy. This is why the maritime force that emerges ultimately from the Defence Review will be one of the most powerful and sophisticated on the planet."
This is why I do not regard the Review as a terminus, but a point of departure. It could not ignore economic difficulties and the imperatives of the current war – nor should it. Instead, it has begun a process of restructuring and rebalancing the UK's Armed Forces which will continue for at least the next ten years. It is setting the conditions for the next Review, scheduled for 2015, which I believe will be when the size, shape and capabilities of our Armed Forces will really begin to crystallise.
In that time frame, the consequences of our moving out of a combat role and drawing down troop numbers in Afghanistan by 2015 and – as recognised by the Prime Minister – the need for real terms growth in Defence spending from 2015 onwards, remain to be seen. But the Navy will by then be developing and bringing into service a range of new platforms and capabilities, the requirement for which have been endorsed by a Review process that scrutinised the Navy very closely.
They include of course the Type 45 Destroyer, but also the Astute class submarines, the second of which, HMS AMBUSH, was launched only a few months ago. By 2020 we will also see the Type 26 Global Combat Ship coming in, the Queen Elizabeth Class and the Joint Combat Aircraft (Jouint Stike Fighter, Lightening II) and associated support shipping, to say nothing of the replacement deterrent, something to which the Government remains strongly committed.
And the Royal Navy will continue to invest in technology. That is why, whilst mindful of the inevitable affordability challenges, we continue to recognise the importance of a number of future capability themes. For example; the value of retaining flexibility, adaptability and resilience as key drivers for maritime capability; a need to appreciate the significance of cyber and space as areas for further exploitation; elevating the importance of mitigating the environmental impact of operating at sea; increasing the use of simulation by developing maritime synthetic training; and exploring the future potential for unmanned platforms.
But while the new ships, submarines and aircraft we will witness entering service in the coming years are important, and necessary technological development exciting, they are far from being the whole story.
The second enabler of the future force is our people. The Royal Navy of the future will depend, just as crucially, on our ability to think and act strategically; in other words, on the quality of our people, their intellect and, as always, their courage.
The 'people challenge' for the future is fundamentally the same one faced by most organisations that must nurture innovation and encourage fresh thinking. The challenge is retaining the high quality people we need to do a complex, demanding job in extreme environments, while ensuring that they do their job better than their competitors. We need to mitigate against the risk that the 20th Century American philosopher, Erich Fromm, foresaw. The risk that, 'the danger of the future is that men may become robots'.
For the future Royal Navy, it is not robots but people; well led, committed, confident at operating in the maritime environment, and expert in handling risk that will deliver the battle winning strategic edge. That is why we remain dedicated to keeping people at the heart of our Service and our success.
As the author, Roger Barnett, suggests in his analysis of naval culture, 'expeditionary naval forces have long been forward, mobile, offensive, self-reliant, and adaptable...that is why naval forces have an expeditionary mindset...the ability to think outside the box and take risk.' Put another way, the very nature of the maritime environment motivates a manoeuverist mindset which needs constant nurturing.
Amidst a dynamic security environment, the nature of maritime power is largely a constant. In my view, if we are to respond successfully to the speed and unpredictability which characterise the security environment of not just today, but tomorrow, then Navies need to be strategically flexible, where being operationally versatile, interoperable and appropriately scaled are all key to delivering the roles of maritime power, maritime security and maritime engagement. And enabling all of this, is a need to have technologically capable platforms and innovative, adaptable people.
All this so important because Navies, both now and in the future, need to be recognised essentially as strategic instruments, which should be used strategically.
The First Sea Lord delivered an address of which this is an edited version at a Future Naval Forces Conference at 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1 on Thursday 14 Apr 2011
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