SDSR highlights the need for national strategy

By Hon Bernard Jenkin MP, Chairman, Public Administration Committee, House of Commons

Just before the publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), PASC (the Public Administration Select Committee) published the report on our inquiry into "Who Does UK National Strategy?" The answer to our question was almost invariably, "no one".

This was borne out by the SDSR process, which became little more than a running feud between the MoD and the Treasury over the extent of the cuts to be made to the defence budget. The SDSR should have started by asking what we need the armed forces for; what they must be capable of doing; and what therefore we need to have; and therefore how much it will cost. Instead, the real terms cut in defence spending were pre-determined. This leaves a fundamental mismatch between the Foreign Secretary's ambitions for UK foreign policy and the reality of cuts in Defence. He told the House of Commons at the outset of the coalition, "The Government rejects the idea of strategic shrinkage", and in a series of speeches proposed a "distinctive British Foreign policy that extends our global reach and influence". This is difficult to reconcile with a 30% cut in the UK's deployable military capability.

A lack of strategic coherence was also evident in some of the specific decisions taken in the SDSR. The cancellation of Nimrod MRA4 was an easy political hit, since it was a programme so grossly late and over budget, but where is the assessment which justifies the loss of the first line of conventional deterrence against surface ships or submarines? At a time when Russian submarines are constantly playing a silent cat-and-mouse game in UK waters to try to record each Vanguard sub's sound "signature", the loss of the reconnaissance capability represented by Nimrod will also increase the risks to the nuclear deterrent in the years ahead.

The SDSR states that "there is a strategic requirement for a future carrier-strike capability", yet the withdrawal of our existing carrier and the Harrier jets will leave the UK without exactly that for the next decade. No one can foresee what threats may emerge during the next ten years. The SDSR does not explain why the years before 2020 should be treated differently from the years after. In his statement to the House, the Prime Minister said, "over the longer term we cannot assume that bases for land-based aircraft will always be available when and where we need them". Why only "over the longer term"?

One of the carriers is immediately to be put on "extended readiness", yet the SDSR also states that "we might sell one of the carriers", which would be beyond readiness altogether. Which is it? And how do we justify retaining just one carrier, which means the maritime air component will be available only for 50% of the time? Nowhere is this justified or explained. The new Franco-British defence treaties are no substitute for sovereign UK capability. In any case, they were not part of the SDSR, but an afterthought. The carrier itself is made more vulnerable by the parallel decision to reduce the surface fleet from 23 to 19 frigates and destroyers. There is a strong case for many more, much cheaper ships, in order to "extend our global role and influence", but there is no evidence that this option has been considered. Indeed, there is no evidence that the MoD has thought comprehensively about the alternatives and possibilities. It was probably impossible to do so in the time available. Instead, a reduction in the UK's deployable military capability has been announced without any explanation of what limitations that will place on the UK's ability to influence, to deter and to defeat our enemies. Is this strategic blindness on the part of the government? Or is it a reality which ministers understand but dare not admit?

The most startling change in the SDSR was the decision to delay 'Main Gate' for the replacing of the Trident submarines, until 2016. This may seem to be a minor adjustment, but it has strategic implications. The effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent is crucially dependent upon resolve, intent and on the signals we send to the wider world about what sort of country we are. On this, the government has faltered. This must raise a question amongst those whom we seek to deter: that we are faltering in our determination to defend our country, our wider interests and our allies. The Liberal Democrats are clearly delighted that the future of the deterrent is once again 'in play'. The SDSR attaches no strategic significance to this delay, against the understated assessment that "We cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons might increase". The Government has tried to tone down the alarm about nuclear proliferation to justify their lack of urgency. The Lib Dem Armed Forces Minister Nick Harvey clearly does regard the delay as significant, having recently stated: "We now have a period of time for a mature debate about alternatives and approaches." 

From now on, the UK needs a process of continuous strategic thinking, so that all departments are working towards clearly defined national goals. The NSS and the establishment of the National Security Council are a welcome start, but national strategy needs to look beyond security, and inform the whole workings of Government. To achieve this, the PASC report recommends that the government should promote a culture of strategic thinking across Whitehall, led by a community of strategic thinkers, preferably with a (minimal) central budget, under the NSC. 

The Government argues that strategic direction is already provided by the NSC, and that its strategy is set out in the Coalition Programme for Government. But strategy is different from a set of policies, and the National Security Council and the Cabinet are decision-making bodies, with no capacity for strategic assessment. 

The Government has largely rejected PASC's findings, while defining strategy very narrowly, on the tiniest definition of "our national interest". When I tabled a question to the Prime Minister asking what the Government considered to be 'the national interest', the answer I received was simply: "I refer the hon. Member to section 2.12 of the National Security Strategy: Our security, prosperity and freedom are interconnected and mutually supportive. They constitute our national interest." This is pathetic! The Government, while often referring to 'our' national interest, is also unwilling to address the fundamental question of who 'we' are as a nation – this is not attempted in either the NSS or the SDSR.

PASC will return to the subject of national strategy. We have published a follow-up report on the Government's response to our recommendations and intend to secure a debate on this subject in Parliament through the new Backbench Business Committee. In the meantime, I have sent a copy of our reports and of the Government's response to the Chilcot Inquiry. They may wish to ensure that the strategic mistakes which were made in the past are not repeated. But if the recent decisions are anything to go by, there is little reason to believe there is a comprehensive understanding in Whitehall of what the word "strategy" actually means.