Mind the Gap III : Russia, the Seabed and the Return of Maritime Competition

The loss of the submarine Kursk in August 2000 exposed the fragile condition of Russia's navy at the start of the century. Ageing equipment, maintenance shortcomings and limited rescue capability combined to reveal how far the fleet had declined since the Soviet collapse. The disaster did not in itself trigger reform, but it became a powerful symbol of neglect and reinforced the political case for reinvestment in maritime power.

During the following decade, Russia's naval trajectory began to shift. Increased defence spending, supported by rising state revenues, enabled a gradual move away from the numerical mass of the Soviet fleet towards a smaller but more capable force. Submarine capability became the central pillar of this modernisation. The Borei class strengthened the survivability of the sea-based nuclear deterrent, while the Yasen class introduced a new generation of attack submarines designed for strike, intelligence and anti-submarine roles. In this structure, the Northern Fleet retained its position as the centre of gravity, hosting the majority of Russia's nuclear-powered submarines and remaining central to strategic planning.

Operational patterns reflected this renewed emphasis. Patrol activity increased steadily, and long-range aviation flights into the North Atlantic approaches resumed, often shadowed by NATO aircraft. The concentration of modern submarine capability in the Northern Fleet underlines Moscow's prioritisation of the High North as the principal maritime theatre.

Infrastructure revival accompanied platform modernisation. Across the Arctic littoral, a network of airfields, radar sites and logistics hubs has been refurbished or rebuilt along the Northern Sea Route. Many of these facilities had fallen into reduced readiness after the Cold War. Their restoration provides surveillance coverage and operational depth, supporting both defensive and strategic objectives in the region.

The strategic environment itself has evolved. Climate change is extending the navigable season across Arctic waters, increasing commercial interest in northern routes. China's growing presence as a self-described near-Arctic actor broadens the geopolitical context, even if its direct military footprint remains limited. The cumulative effect is a more crowded and contested northern maritime space.

Attention has also shifted beneath the surface. Subsea communications cables and offshore energy infrastructure now represent critical national assets, and their vulnerability has become a central concern for European governments. Recent European security reporting has raised concerns that ostensibly civilian vessels linked to Russia may have conducted seabed survey activity around energy and communications infrastructure in the North Sea, underscoring the growing strategic sensitivity of undersea terrain even in peacetime.

In the United Kingdom, these concerns briefly entered public debate following media reporting on suspicious vessel movements, including discussion of whether interdiction or inspection might be appropriate. No such action was ultimately taken, but the episode highlighted the degree to which undersea infrastructure security has moved from specialist circles into wider strategic awareness.

Developments outside the Arctic have also influenced perceptions of Russian naval capability. During the invasion of Ukraine, several amphibious vessels from the Northern Fleet deployed southwards, moving through the Baltic before operating in the Black Sea theatre. Their subsequent status remains unclear in open reporting, yet the episode illustrated the flexibility of Russian naval deployments while leaving the Northern Fleet's core submarine strength largely unaffected.

The conflict imposed costs as well. Naval infantry units associated with the Northern Fleet reportedly suffered significant casualties in the early stages of the war, prompting renewed attention to intelligence and support capabilities. Such developments demonstrate the pressures placed on Russia's armed forces across multiple theatres, but they do not fundamentally alter the fleet's strategic maritime role.

The sinking of the cruiser Moskva in the Black Sea further illustrated the constraints imposed by geography and treaty regimes. Efforts to reinforce the theatre with additional ships of the same class were limited by the Montreux Convention, which restricts naval transit into the Black Sea. While surface combatants retain symbolic importance, their strategic impact is overshadowed by the continuing centrality of submarine forces in Russian doctrine.

Taken together, these developments point to a sustained revival of Russian maritime capability in the High North. The Northern Fleet today is neither a replica of its Soviet predecessor nor a purely regional force; it is a modernised formation designed to secure Russia's strategic deterrent, protect Arctic approaches and operate across the wider North Atlantic when required.

The return of maritime competition to the region has therefore been gradual rather than abrupt. Structural drivers — geography, resource interests, technological change and strategic ambition — have combined to restore the North Atlantic, and the seabed beneath it, to a position of renewed importance.

In the next article, we will examine further wider strategic implications and how other nations are taking an interest in the Arctic region, further increasing the importance of the Gap and its significance for bastion defence, chokepoints and sea lanes.

Curated by Robin Ashby, Director General, U K Defence Forum. Drafted by ChatGPT 5.2.