Mali today : a flawed poster child for democracy in Africa

'Humpty-Dumpty' Democracy? Mali today. By James Moar

Until February this year, Mali was a poster child of African democracy. A military coup to overthrow an oligarchic president freely gave way to an elected presidential government on the French model with little to no tensions in the aftermath. And although the elections have had a global low of 21.7% voter turnout, the system functioned. At least on the surface.

The occurrence of open elections happened alongside longstanding social divisions, inequalities and even in some cases slavery. While the 1992 constitution proclaims a "determination to defend the rights of women and children" and that "[a]ny discrimination based on social origin, colour, language, race, sex, religion, or political opinion is prohibited" , there have been reports of widespread tolerated spousal abuse and intrastate child trafficking. There is also a longstanding history of slavery of the Tamachek ethnic group, a situation that is particularly prevalent in the north. Democratic principles are also misunderstood on a large scale: some of the more rural Malians have been unable to understand how governance can be stable if there is "more than one chief" or if anyone can "depose" the chief. It is this last point that may go some way to explaining recent events.

The coup of 22nd March was precipitated by the lack of reaction to a Tuareg rebellion in February, which has now expanded into an almost complete secession of northern Mali. It was led by army captain Amadou Sanogo and a group of other junior officers, who were frustrated at then president Amandou Touré's failure to deal with the Tuareg rebellion, and precipitated weeks before a presidential election. The aftermath of the coup has left the military fragmented and destabilised, and they are currently in no position to pose a threat to the north. Mali today is fragmented in every sense, and questions remain about which way those fragments will fall.

Azawad : Child of Tuaregs, Islamists and convenience

The current Tuareg rebellion began in mid-January this year, as an estimated 2,500 Tuaregs who had fought in Libya returned with fresh arms to add to a growing stockpile. While there was a show of reintegrating these returned fighters into the Malian state, this was clearly not enough to quell residual separatist tendencies, which have been part of the Tuareg ethnic identity since the first rebellion against French colonial rule in 1916.

This influx of able troops and weapons has allowed the recent rebellion to be far more successful than those previously, being commanded by Ag Bahanga, who cut his teeth in the 1990 uprising and was one of the leaders of the 2006 rebellion. All the signs pointed to a far more capable rebellion than those which had been executed previously. The clearest sign of this was the Tuareg MNLA (Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad) driving back the Mali army in skirmishes in late March and early May as the consequences of the coup made themselves felt in the south. And then an Islamist group became involved.

The Islamists calling themselves Ansar Dine ("Defenders/Supporters of the Faith") formed an armed allegiance with the MNLA to drive the Mali government forces out of what were previously the administrative districts of Timbuktu, Gao and semi-autonomous Kidal. This alliance has no historical basis, as previous Tuareg rebellions have sought to distance themselves from Islamists. This is completely at odds with a recent statement by an MNLA spokesman that they and Ansar Dine "have always shared the same objectives, even if our methods were different". Despite these pronouncements of unity and three weeks of talks, a further accord has not yet been signed due to disagreements on how Sharia is to be implemented in the new state; meanwhile Ansar Dine has been closing television stores, enforcing strict Islamic dress on women and beating men found smoking in the streets.

There were signs of friction at the heart of the alliance, which have now flared into armed conflict. Armed groups from MNLA and Ansar Dine have been taking down each others' flags from government buildings, and there was open, armed confrontation between the two groups in Kidal on 7th June. There were over 500 people protesting the imposition of Sharia law, suggesting that any Islamist solution is unlikely to be accepted by the populace unless it is backed by force. Mali's predominant form of Islam is Sufi-based and tolerant, for although Wahhabist strains have been present since the 1940s, these have never had much support. A Malian journalist has remarked that the recent attacks and the instances of flag-swapping indicate that the conflict is becoming "tribal".

This situation is unlikely to get better, as Ansar Dine has been linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), although there have been attempts by the MNLA to persuade Ansar Dine to abandon this. If AQIM can be used as a pattern for Ansar Dine's behaviour, the group's strategy can be forecast. AQIM has never established stable zones of control outside its own members' habitations. They have been noted attempting to establish friendly contacts in Gao province, but this assumes a pre-existing society in which to be based. Given that there are now 64,000 Malian refugees in one Mauritanian camp alone, that society is rapidly disintegrating, and Ansar Dine's welcome is wearing thin on the Tuaregs. This is underlined by the formation of several armed secular Tuareg groups alongside anti-separatist militias.

The effective exercise of military force may be the sole determinant of the future of Azawad, and there are several actors prepared to back up their claim with violence. This includes the international community at present; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) pledged in May to send 3,000 troops to Mali to help the government bring Awazad back under its control and restore democratic rule, but has not committed to a timetable for this. In addition it met with the MNLA in June in an attempt to negotiate a solution, although nothing definite has been reached at this stage, and both sides have made it clear that the meeting is not an official recognition of Azawad as a state. The situation is becoming increasingly fragmented and violent. Only one thing has become clear over the last few months: the Malian government is certainly in no position to challenge Azawad, as it is currently undergoing crises of its own.

Democratic deficit and impatience: the Malian state

The current situation of the Mali government is one of crisis and inaction; there have been few decisive moves to deal with the Tuareg rebellion, a fact continued after the coup which was claimed to be carried out in frustration over the government's inaction over the rebellion. The coup has paralyzed the Malian armed forces, leaving the Tuaregs and Ansar Dine able to seize a large part of the north.

The country is now not technically under the rule of a military junta, but the coup officers and their supporters still apparently hold much influence. Captain Amadou Sanogo was "bought out" soon after the coup: he agreed to step down on 20th May and give power to an interim government provided he was given the benefits of a former head of state. These include a large pension, chauffeured car and palatial residence all funded by the state. Since this deal was brokered, the Malian parliament has passed a motion pardoning the coup leaders. This move is likely to be popular, as there are still several vocal supporters of Sanogo in Bamako.

Following a meeting in April establishing an interim government for a year to ensure a full transition to democracy, the 70-year-old Dioncounda Traoré was appointed as interim president by ECOWAS, initially for 40 days. The deal was rejected by Sanogo's supporters who argued that it should be up to the military to decide who governs the country after the 40-day period. Sanogo particularly objected to the principle of ECOWAS troops deploying in the country, which may be the reason behind the lack of a timetable for deployment.

The 40-day deadline has since passed and Traoré remains in power, with all the signs that he intends to stay for the year period outlined by ECOWAS. This is with the agreement of Sanogo, but apparently not his supporters, who broke into the presidential palace in Bamako on 21st May and beat Traoré unconscious during a protest. He was flown to France for medical treatment, stoking fears that the ECOWAS deal had broken down and caused some to proclaim a "constitutional crisis" in the country. 50 people have since been arrested in connection with the incident, showing that some institutions still function. How long this can continue for is nonetheless questionable, as Traoré is still in Paris recovering from surgery.

Crystal gazing in the desert: Consequences for the future of Mali and the Sahel

Events in Mali appear to be spiralling out of control, cheered on by segments of the population. Awazad has been a long-cherished dream for many Tuaregs, and may be clung to with force even if the province proves ungovernable in the long term. Inaction in Bamako by the Mali politicians and ECOWAS looks set to continue despite promises that long-standing complaints about a self-serving political elite will be addressed. The fallout from these twin problems may affect a far wider audience than just Malians.

The most immediate problem from a security perspective is the ability of AQIM to use the territory to strike elsewhere. While the group has historically had a stronger base in Algeria, it has been able to act in Mali with impunity, with reports of much activity in November 2011, particularly in Gao province. This activity ranged from foreign kidnappings to raise income to handing out money and chocolate at waterholes in an attempt to build a sympathetic base there.

If successful this may have implications for their criminal activity as well as their terrorism; Mali reported seizures of 116 kg of cocaine in 2007, and the group may have had a hand in over 5,000 kg more from South America, using the Sahel as a route into Europe. In addition to cocaine, there is a long-established cannabis route via Bamako, although it is unclear if AQIM has any involvement in this. They do however have a history of cigarette smuggling operations, using the north in particular as an ignored safe haven from which to conduct their operations into the rest of North Africa.

Alongside the drugs trade, the conflict may impact commodity trading more generally. The oil-rich Taoudeni Basin is situated in the Timbuktu region, now in control of the Islamists. The interim government raised the tax rate on gold to 8% in May, although mining operations have not yet been directly threatened by actions in the north. However, if the political chaos in Bamako continues, it could spell trouble for most commodities being traded in and out of the country.
The political circumstances on both sides of the country are unstable and currently prone to quick changes, with much potential for violence. However, without resolving the current imbalance of physical power within the country the existing actors will likely continue to bicker violently without any decisive result, and the potential for more actors from internal and external groups to become involved will increase.

Therefore, without the political will to rebuild the Mali military and take decisive control of Azawad, the country looks set to fragment further, and with Mali's large range of ethnicities, such a situation would take a huge effort to resolve to the satisfaction of all parties, if a solution is possible at all.