A cold shoulder : The trouble with the EU's Arctic policy

By James Macadam

In the summer of 1856 the dashing British diplomat Lord Dufferin, accompanied by his longsuffering butler 'Wilson', joined a French cruise to the Arctic led by Napoleon III. Despite wooing Nordic girls in Latin and organising can-can dances aboard ship, the Europeans were warmly received in northern climes. By contrast, today's European diplomats seem to be getting a chillier reception beyond the 66th parallel.

The Arctic is currently governed by a set of piecemeal agreements between the 'Arctic Five' - those states that have Arctic Ocean coastline (Russia, America, Canada, Norway and Denmark, of which Greenland is a part). Much of the negotiation happens bi-laterally or in specialist forums like the Arctic Council. Initially created to provide information for policy makers, the latter involves a wider range of Arctic players including Sweden, Finland and Iceland. Representatives from the region's many indigenous groups are permanent members. Six non-Arctic states and a number of international organizations including the United Nations Development and Environment Programmes also enjoy "observer status" at its discussions. But despite a formal application in 2009, the EU itself is not among them.

There are several reasons for this icy Arctic front moving over Brussels. The established northern states closely guard their rights to govern the rapidly melting Arctic Ocean with its promise of oil and gas riches as well as faster shipping routes. The Arctic Council itself worries that it may be usurped by greater EU involvement. It argues that Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Poland and the Netherlands are already 'observers' in their own right making yet more European participation unnecessary. The indigenous groups that enjoy a special status at the Arctic Council are also unhappy with the EU following bans on seal products which, before recent amendments, badly impacted their traditional economies.

Suitably chastened, the European Parliament has now altered its approach. In January it published the latest in a series of Arctic strategy documents stressing Europe's longstanding economic and political ties with the North. The EU, it points out, already has three Arctic Council members (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) and the possibility of a fourth if Iceland joins. But the new strategy also suggests that Europe has something more fundamental to offer the Arctic. Through efforts like the Northern Dimension Initiative which brings Scandinavia, Russia and the Baltic states together to discuss a range of sustainability and environmental issues, Brussels claims to have proven its diplomatic credentials in dealing with relevant Arctic problems. And in some specific areas - particularly in regulating Arctic shipping - co-operation between Arctic states and their European trading partners will be vital. All this means that European big-wigs, most notably Diana Wallis, vice-president of the European Parliament, feel that the EU deserves a prominent political role in Arctic affairs.

The immediate prospects for this do not look good, however. The Arctic Council may still lack sufficient funding and a permanent secretariat, but it is working well without the EU. Its recent reports on oil and gas development and shipping are well regarded by the relevant industries. And with the legacy of Cold War still strong in the High North, the Arctic Council's strictly apolitical stance on military and territorial issues has seen it sidestep major disagreement among its core members. At present it seems more likely that the Council's next "observers" will be China and Japan.

The best the EU might hope for in the short term is therefore a practical, rather than a political role in Arctic matters. The North has many problems and, despite its unwieldy structure, the EU does have expertise to offer. Both the European Commission and Parliament should therefore now focus more on providing pragmatic solutions, with negotiations on shipping, fisheries and climate change being good places to start. By limiting its involvement to these key areas, the EU should be able to prove its usefulness without challenging the sovereignty of any Arctic state or institution. Brussels' latest effort is a step in this direction, but it may still be a while until Lord Dufferin's successors (and their butlers) will be welcomed northwards with such aplomb.