Wednesday, 10 September 2025
logo
Up-to-the-minute perspectives on defence, security and peace
issues from and for policy makers and opinion leaders.
        



dv-header-dday
     |      View our Twitter page at twitter.com/defenceredbox     |     

By Alasdair McKay, UK Defence Forum Researcher.

On July 9th, the Republic of South Sudan became the youngest state in the world. This came to pass as a result of a January referendum in which the people of the South decided to secede from the North. However, it was an inception tainted by violence. Since June 5th, heavy fighting had been underway in South Kordofan, a North-South Sudanese border state, between the Sudanese Army and Nuba rebels allied with the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) – the military wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement of South Sudan (SPLM) and now the official army of the South.

South Kordofan is certainly no stranger to violence. The area was a key battleground during the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005), which saw many in the Nuba Mountains side with the then rebel SPLA. Yet, in spite of the conflict's cessation with the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Nuba people still have serious grievances.

Although the CPA set up referenda for the South to vote on its independence and another vote for the contested area of Abyei to choose whether it is part of the North or the South, the inhabitants of Southern Kordofan were given a "Popular Consultation", a process that asks the people what they want for the future. However, many feel that it did not provide a strong enough mechanism to guarantee the rights they desired. Moreover, the North-South separation sees the Nuba on the North side of the border, something which they fought for many years to avoid.

Tensions in the region increased when Abdul Aziz Adam Al-Hilu, the leader of the SPLM in South Kordofan, refused to concede defeat in the state's gubernatorial elections to Ahmad Harun, the incumbent governor of the ruling National Congress Party who is wanted by the International Criminal Court for alleged crimes against humanity committed in Darfur. Al-Hilu and the state's deputy governor alleged that the vote was rigged and thus refused to recognise the result.


Further, the Khartoum government attempted to disarm the SPLA-aligned Nuba fighters – thought to number around 40,000 – saying it would not tolerate the existence of two armies within its borders after the South separates. This move was resisted by the Nuba rebels. The fallout from this saw fighting erupt and escalate alarmingly quickly.

Over 60,000 combatants are now in the area under the command of the Sudanese Army, and there are at least 30,000 SPLA-aligned Nuba rebels. Despite North and South Sudan recently agreeing to create a demilitarized buffer zone along their common border, a ceasefire has yet to be reached in South Kordofan. As a result of this standoff, there has been much civilian suffering.

The Sudanese government has been accused by the UN of carrying out intensive bombings on non-combatants using warplanes. Aid workers report that the Nuba people are being targeted by the Sudanese Army and Arab militias on the ground. It has also been alleged that aid agency offices have been looted, churches have been ransacked and buildings destroyed. Nuba leaders claim that some 140,000 people have been displaced by the fighting, although UN experts have put the figure at 70,000. Those fleeing from the violence have been left with little to no access to humanitarian assistance or supplies. The Sudanese Army is reportedly denying relief agencies access to warehouses with supplies and humanitarian flights are being refused permission to land.

There is something painfully familiar about all of this. The current situation in South Kordofan is starting to resemble the tragic episodes which the area experienced in the early to mid 1990s. In a brutal response to the Nuba people's indigenous rebellion and alliance with the SPLA during the Second Sudanese Civil War, the Khartoum government and its forces perpetrated genocidal actions in the Nuba Mountains, largely by starving people to death and preventing humanitarian aid from reaching the victims. In eight years, some 500,000 people were killed or displaced. Today, the Khartoum government appears to be implementing a similar approach. Despite the regime's massive military build-up in the regional capital of Kadugli – including hundreds of heavy military vehicles – it is reluctant to confront the Nuba SPLA in the rocky terrain. Subsequently, the more effective and devastating strategy has been to attack civilians, and then to cut off aid all together.

Behind the events in South Kordofan, a larger game of power politics is being played between North and South Sudan. Khartoum has long stressed its strategic interest in disputed peripheral regions of North Sudan inhabited predominantly by non-Arabs such as South Kordofan. Indeed, the North has frequently been accused of arming Arab tribes in South Kordofan, especially in front-line areas and regions in rebellion, though it has repeatedly denied doing so. Although they are a minority, the Arabized tribes of South Kordofan are pro-North and want the implementation of Islamic Sharia law. In contrast, the non-Arab indigenous peoples are pro-South and seek autonomy from the North.

If the North's past activities in Darfur and Abyei are anything to go by, then it is probable that it will endeavour to increase its control of South Kordofan through forced displacement of non-Arabs, and then by moving pro-North Arab groups into the region. The SPLM certainly shares this belief. In a recent statement, Bol Makueng, secretary of information for the SPLM states that "The Sudanese Army's] mission is to disarm the Sudan People's Liberation Movement component of the Joint Integrated Units in South Kordofan and to clear the area of Nuba in order to settle Arab tribes there as done in Darfur and Abyei. This is a clear violation of the terms of Comprehensive Peace Agreement."

The North's particular interest in South Kordofan lies in the region's resources, especially the oil reserves. South Kordofan has the most productive oil fields that are left in the North after the split, but the Nuba rebels seek to gain greater control over these resources. The North perceives this as something that it can allow to happen as oil is central to Khartoum's power base. The North-South separation could see Khartoum lose up to 75% of Sudan's 500,000 barrels per day of oil output. South Sudan contains around 75% of Sudan's total production of oil, but North Sudan owns most of the oil refineries, the pipeline and the ports from where the oil would be shipped. The CPA stipulates that North Sudan shares 50% of the oil revenues produced in South Sudan, but a deal has yet to be reached on this issue. The Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, has recently threatened to close pipelines carrying South Sudan's oil if this issue is unresolved before the South's independence. Only time will tell if he carries out these threats. Nevertheless, oil may prove to be a continual obstacle to peaceful relations being achieved in the future between North and South Sudan. The clashes that are transpiring in Abyei, another oil-rich area on the border, illustrate this problem clearly.

Recently, the African Union mediated a South Kordofan ceasefire deal. This deal proposes that all Nuba fighters will be demobilized or integrated into the national army. When taking into consideration the fact that the violence emerged after the government attempted to disarm the Nuba fighters and that they wish South Kordofan to join South Sudan, the deal seems to be doomed for failure. Nevertheless, an effective resolution to the situation in South Kordofan must be found. A senior UN human rights official has warned that full-scale war between North and South Sudan will break out if the South Kordofan clashes escalate further. Although this would certainly be a worst case scenario, the risk is now very real.

 

Cookies
We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue without changing your settings, we'll assume that you are happy to receive all cookies on the Defence Viewpoints website. However, if you would like to, you can modify your browser so that it notifies you when cookies are sent to it or you can refuse cookies altogether. You can also delete cookies that have already been set. You may wish to visit www.aboutcookies.org which contains comprehensive information on how to do this on a wide variety of desktop browsers. Please note that you will lose some features and functionality on this website if you choose to disable cookies. For example, you may not be able to link into our Twitter feed, which gives up to the minute perspectives on defence and security matters.