Nuclear Deterrence

“A world without nuclear weapons may be a dream but you cannot base a sure defence on dreams. Without far greater trust and confidence between East and West than exists at present, a world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us.”

These words were spoken by Margaret Thatcher on her visit to Moscow on March 30, 1987. We now know that the days of the Soviet Union were numbered. In the post-Cold War period, many hoped for a new era in international relations, and so it seemed for a period. But the increasingly belligerent tone taken by Vladimir Putin has ended that hope. Following the full scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Thatcher’s words echo down to us across the years.

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SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF FAILURE: LESSONS FROM THE SOUTHPORT INQUIRY

A first report that should be read in every security agency, police service and threat assessment unit — not just in the United Kingdom
Everything described in the Southport Inquiry Phase 1 Report is connected. The failures are not discrete events in a chain; they are mutually reinforcing systemic weaknesses that compounded one another over years. That is the central lesson, and it is one that practitioners in the defence and security community will recognise immediately — because they have seen it before, at home and abroad. This short series will also address "before" and finally ask the question "What next?"

By Euan Grant, Senior Research Associate, U K Defence Forum

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With apologies to Nick Watts for the delay in publishing this.

Commentary 20 March 2026 - Primus inter Pares

In the UK's unwritten constitution the head of the government is called the prime minister. This office reflects the role of the current holder as the leader of a government that commands a majority in the House of Commons. As the leader of the cabinet, this office is frequently described as being 'primus inter pares' first among equals.

This constitutional confection has come under strain recently as the current incumbent seems to be struggling a bit. Commentary does not take a party-political position, other than to keep the debate about defence and security in the public eye. Nor will there be a repetition of other comments which have been made about the present situation.

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THE CASPIAN FLOTILLA: LAND-LOCKED BUT LETHAL

By Robin Ashby, Chair, Eurodefence Russia Observatory. (AI Assisted)

It should not, by rights, matter very much. The Caspian Flotilla is the smallest of Russia's five naval formations, operates on a landlocked sea covering 371,000 square kilometres, cannot reach any ocean without being physically dismantled and moved by canal, and for most of its three-century existence was treated as a useful backwater — a place to test ideas, train conscripts, and police a lake. The Caspian is not the North Atlantic. It is not even the Black Sea. Yet on the morning of 7 October 2015, four small Russian warships moored at Astrakhan and Kaspiysk fired twenty-six Kalibr 3M54 cruise missiles at Islamic State positions in northern Syria. The missiles flew over Iran and Iraq. The targets were over 1,500 kilometres away. The Caspian Flotilla had just announced itself to a world that had not been paying attention.

Seven years later, in March 2022, the Flotilla fired again — this time at a Ukrainian fuel depot in Kostiantynivka, Mykolaiv Oblast. The geography had not changed. The strategic reach had not changed. What had changed was the target, the political context, and the degree of vulnerability of the formation conducting the strikes. That tension — between sanctuary and exposure, between offensive reach and institutional fragility — is what makes the Caspian Flotilla analytically worth the effort.

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The Curator asked about Naval Infantry: Recruitment, Attrition, in the Far East as a resukt of Ukraine War (for similar study see Mind the Gap series and associated papers about the Northern Fleet)
Key finding: Both Pacific Fleet naval infantry brigades have been effectively destroyed and reconstituted multiple times since 2022. They recruit primarily from Russia's Far Eastern federal subjects — Primorsky Krai, Kamchatka, Khabarovsk Krai — meaning the human cost of the Ukraine war falls disproportionately on Russia's most geographically isolated and politically marginal communities. The reconstitution of these formations as divisions is an organisational aspiration rather than a current military reality.

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Curator asked about the Sea of Okhotsk Bastion - Concept and Reality (echoing similar for Barents Bastion and Northern Fleet)

Key finding: The Sea of Okhotsk bastion is Russia's primary mechanism for preserving its Pacific second-strike nuclear deterrent. It is a layered concept — not a single defensive line — encompassing coastal missile systems, island chain fortification, submarine patrol areas, and aviation coverage. Japan's expanding ASW capability and the AUKUS nuclear submarine programme are the two developments most likely to complicate it over the next decade.

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The Curator asked about Okean 2024: Show of Force or Strategic Signal?

Key finding: Okean 2024 was the largest Russian naval exercise since the Soviet collapse, reviving a Cold War format after a 39-year gap. The political message — to NATO, to China, and to Russian domestic audiences — outweighed its military substance. Its most significant deficit was the conspicuous absence of any tactical reflection of the drone and naval warfare lessons from the Black Sea.

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Accurate and timely information is hard to get on a subject most nations consider classified. THe Curator asked abiut the operational availability of submarines in the Pacific Fleet. This is a best effort by AI at April 2026. Sources given in text and footnote

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