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nickwattsIMG 20170907 0924504The 67th edition of the Military Balance was launched at the London based International Institute for Strategic Studies on 24th February, the 4th anniversary of the start of the Russia – Ukraine conflict. Nick Watts was there for Defence Viewpoints. He writes: This was a sobering backdrop against which to be considering the current military – strategic environment.
Alongside a review of developments in the conflict in Ukraine, attention focussed on developments in the Middle East, notably the likelihood of a further US strike against Iran and the wider implications for security in the region. The rise of China as a military power was another factor which figured large.

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AI logoEditor's note : This op-ed is written entirely by AI (ChatGPT 5.2 ) without editorial filter. It is in response to reports that Anthropic (Claude) is willing to work with the military, but only under strict limits. The company does not want its AI powering fully autonomous weapons or unrestricted battlefield decisions. DoD officials reportedly want broader use for lawful military purposes

The growing tension between advanced AI developers and defence institutions is often framed as a cultural mismatch: technologists emphasising safety while military planners emphasise mission effectiveness. But this interpretation understates the significance of the moment. What is taking shape is a new settlement over how transformative digital capabilities are governed when they intersect with national security.

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AI logoThe strategic geography of the North Atlantic does not end at the GIUK Gap. It extends northward into the Barents and Norwegian Seas and onward into the Arctic Ocean, where changing environmental conditions, revived Russian force posture and widening global maritime competition reshape what was once a largely frozen flank. The region is not becoming a new theatre in isolation, but rather a return to the long-standing logic of bastion defence, maritime chokepoints and the protection of sea lines of communication that characterised the latter decades of the Cold War.

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Commentary NW 95537d11-af3f-45c3-9657-a9695f1f7296Nick Watts writes:

MOD and SMEs

On 28th January, the MOD announced the launch of a bespoke £20 million fund to offer accelerated contracts to small, innovative British startups who have had limited or no business contact with the Ministry of Defence. The fund is part of the government's commitment to make Britain the best place to start and grow a defence business.

As set out in the Defence Industrial Strategy, the government sees defence as an engine for growth, "and small businesses are the backbone of UK defence, bringing the innovation, agility and fresh thinking that UK Armed Forces need to transform and stay ahead of increasing and evolving threats."

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AI logoThe loss of the submarine Kursk in August 2000 exposed the fragile condition of Russia's navy at the start of the century. Ageing equipment, maintenance shortcomings and limited rescue capability combined to reveal how far the fleet had declined since the Soviet collapse. The disaster did not in itself trigger reform, but it became a powerful symbol of neglect and reinforced the political case for reinvestment in maritime power.

During the following decade, Russia's naval trajectory began to shift. Increased defence spending, supported by rising state revenues, enabled a gradual move away from the numerical mass of the Soviet fleet towards a smaller but more capable force. Submarine capability became the central pillar of this modernisation. The Borei class strengthened the survivability of the sea-based nuclear deterrent, while the Yasen class introduced a new generation of attack submarines designed for strike, intelligence and anti-submarine roles. In this structure, the Northern Fleet retained its position as the centre of gravity, hosting the majority of Russia's nuclear-powered submarines and remaining central to strategic planning.

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AI logoStrategy changes gradually before it changes suddenly. Geography, including oceans, does not change; the political weather, and responses to it, do.

The disappearance of the Soviet Union removed the organising threat around which NATO maritime planning had revolved. Russia in the 1990s faced economic collapse, institutional turmoil and a navy struggling to keep vessels seaworthy. Patrol rates fell sharply, maintenance backlogs accumulated, and Western attention shifted towards expeditionary operations elsewhere. Force structures contracted across the Alliance. Escort numbers fell, and maritime focus drifted away from the North Atlantic.

The arithmetic of presence became increasingly stark. Modern warships are far more capable than their predecessors, yet a warship can only be in one place at one time, however sophisticated its sensors or weapons. The operational canvas itself never shrank: the core waters of the Greenland-Iceland-UK corridor cover on the order of six hundred thousand square miles — an area larger than France and Germany combined — far beyond the reach of continuous physical presence by even a substantial escort fleet.

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AI logoIf you travel on the London Underground you will hear the familiar instruction: "Mind the gap."
It is not theatrical. It is not alarmist. It is a reminder that space exists between platform and carriage, and that inattention carries consequences.
In the North Atlantic there is another gap — between Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom — that shaped Cold War strategy and continues to shape European security.
This article sets the historical baseline for a series examining that maritime corridor: how it functioned during the Cold War; how attention to it diminished after 1991; and why it has re-emerged as a strategic concern in an era of renewed great power competition and climate change.
To understand current debate about NATO's northern flank, one must begin when the GIUK Gap was treated not as cartography, but as a strategic fulcrum.

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UKDF Logo old colour When Democratic Decline Comes Through the Post Room, Not the Barricades, Recognition and Reaction are Vital


When people imagine a democracy being undermined, they often picture something dramatic—soldiers in the streets, a leader refusing to leave office, or a sudden suspension of elections. But democracy rarely collapses in a single dramatic moment. More often, it is worn down slowly, through legal changes, administrative pressure, and the reshaping of public perception.
The Brennan Center for Justice, a respected non-partisan institute based at New York University School of Law, has documented this process in the United States since the last Presidential election with unusual clarity. Its Timeline of the Trump Administration's Efforts to Undermine Elections traces a series of actions—rule changes, personnel pressure, centralisation, and the rewarding of those who cast doubt on elections—that together show how democratic norms can be bent long before they break.

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UKDF 2026 smallThe Geopolitical impact today of Lincoln's 1862 Template for Indian Dispossession
By Joseph E Fallon
(with additional material by Robin Ashby)

Introduction

In the annals of history, the American Civil War is often remembered for its seismic confrontation over slavery — but its lesser-examined social template for Indigenous policy has left a long shadow on global governance norms.
In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln and his administration sanctioned a pattern of territorial coercion, legal dispossession, and forced relocation of Native American populations in the Minnesota and elsewhere. Though couched in the language of "civilisation" and "security," the policies established a precedent of state power to redraw human boundaries in pursuit of strategic aims. The furore over Greenland raises similar concerns.

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