Sunday, 07 June 2009
Adam
By Leila Ouardani
"UN Security Council Reform will not be taken up until the Council's membership is so at odds with the modern world that the point is reached where this dysfunction undermines the legitimacy of the Council's decisions."
- Peter Wilenski, Australia's Permanent Representative to the UN, 1991
Peter Wilenski's analysis of the future of UN Security Council reform was made at the time when it had only just begun fulfilling its role as envisaged by its founders. The Cold War had resulted in the virtual paralysis of the Council, with vetoes
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by Leila Ouardani
III: Countering transnational threats
It is important to note that transnational security threats cannot, in the same way that traditional security threats are unable to, ever be entirely eradicated. It is for that reason, as Waever suggests, that desecuritization—the shifting of these issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere, that should be the aim of nation states and collective organisations. The removing of the existential threat (if there is one that is) is therefore the primary aim. It is thus central for the government to acknowledge the fact that the larger areas of the globe are ungovernable and efforts to identify those sectors that "matter" and those that do not. Godson labels these areas as 'zones of influence' and suggests that they will resemble nineteenth century informal empires or spheres of influence.
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Saturday, 30 May 2009
Adam
by Leila Ouardani
"No, most of our political elite have not realized that the world is flat. "
Thomas Friedman
As Thomas Friedman's "flatness" metaphor observes, the compression of time and space and the easy movement of people, weapons, toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas have transformed the way in which threats emerge and challenged the traditional modes of obtaining security used by policymakers. The complexities underlying these transnational movements contest established International Relations theories of agency and scope and have made it increasingly difficult to conceptualize and measure security in this context. During the 1990s when the issue of transnational security first entered security studies dialogue, progress was further hindered by intellectual squabbles between realist, liberalist and constructivist agendas. It was, however, the events of September 11, 2001 that catapulted transnational security to the centre stage: academics and security studies professionals alike now found an attentive audience within international policymaking fora.
I: Widening Security: The 'transnational security' paradigm
The term 'transnational security', also referred to by some scholars as 'transstate security', has not attracted a clear and unambiguous definition as to its nature. Some scholars have gone as far as to suggest that the term 'transnational' should become redundant and replaced with what is considered a more accurate description: 'transsovereign'. For these scholars, in view of the fact that the term 'nation' is not synonymous with the term 'sovereign state', the word 'transnational' is argued to simply add needless confusion to what is an already complicated idea. However a workable definition has been provided in a 1997 outline of the emerging field, Security Studies for the 21st Century, written by Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, and George Quester. In the text, the term 'Transnational security' was referred to as a 'paradigm for understanding the ways in which governments and non-state actors—functioning within and across state borders—interact and affect the defence of states and their citizens.'
Underpinning the transnational security paradigm is the premise that as a result of globalisation, more specifically the growth in open markets, open societies and open economies—security has, in the words of Maryann K. Cusimano, moved to a situation 'beyond sovereignty'. Up until the end of the Cold War, in 1990, the globalizing phenomenon was to quite a considerable extent held in check. However there are some scholars that have voiced skepticism by suggesting that the elevation of transnational security concerns came as a response to find new external threats after Soviet collapse. Matthew and Shambaugh argue that transnational security issues of the level to which the world faces today while clearly being affected by the collapse of a bi-polar world are mainly a result of twentieth century advances in human mobility, communication and technology. It is, however, worthy of note that the emergence of what have been called 'weak states' and 'failed states', following the end of the bipolar geostrategic system, have considerably worsened the effects of transnational security issues.
Sovereignty as a political organization had dominated the international system from the time of the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. From then on, the state had both exclusive and final jurisdiction over a territory and those resources and populations that were found within its territorial borders. This system acknowledges a single political authority which possesses both a monopoly over the use of force but also the role of sole defender and final arbiter of any problems that arise within the territorial borders. Attempts to restrict border and territorial access have long been a core state activity. Historically the vast majority of interstate wars concerned territorial defence and conquest and therefore it is unsurprising that borders were considered primarily in military terms. Nowadays, the marked reduction in interstate military conflicts has resulted in state borders being contested only on rare occasions.
On the other hand, globalisation processes that many commentators consider to contain 'good, progressive, and liberalizing international trends' have led to borders increasingly being penetrated by non-state actors. Indeed central to the transnational security paradigm is the involvement of transnational non-state actors which can affect the defence of states and its citizens. A number of commentators however have been keen to point out that transstate non-state actors have long been a historical reality. Indeed states have been subject to transnational pirates, mercenaries, contraband smugglers, and religious extremists for many centuries. However historically the transnational dimension of their activities were considerably limited without the financial, transportation and communication networks that are unique to our age.
The transnational security paradigm does not only challenge the traditional state-centric paradigm with its incorporation of non-state actors into its framework but also includes somewhat of a widening of the security agenda. Transnational threats often referred to as 'non-traditional threats' often do not pose an existential threat. As Buzan has argued the 'state is less important in the new security agenda than in the old one. It still remains central, but no longer dominates either as the exclusive referent object or as the principle embodiment of the threat'. This shift should be understood in the context of the emergence of concepts such as 'human security' that sought to encompass and recognize security at multiple levels from the global right down to the individual.
II: The main transnational security issues
Statistics demonstrate that in the twentieth century a greater number of casualties have come about due to sub-national and transnational threats than traditional interstate wars. Globally in 1999, for instance, while 33,000 individuals lost their lives in major power conflicts, a staggering 2.8 million people met their death from AIDS, 40,000 through civil conflicts and approximately 1000 as a result of terrorist attacks. The range of non-traditional threats that we face in the twentieth century are considerable. Identifying the main transnational security issues however is not a straightforward task since some transnational security issues have a greater capacity to challenge the security of certain states than others. For instance, the closing of the United Kingdom's only human trafficking police unit in November, 2008 demonstrates that states often need to prioritise those transnational security threats that pose the greatest threat to them.
In recent years, more than any other transnational security issue, the existence of failing and destabilised states has attracted considerable attention from the international security community. The worlds 'failed', and failing, states are widely publicised, they include: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, and Haiti, to name a few. Following these are those states that are considered to be on the brink of collapse such as Pakistan. It is now widely believed that in our highly globalized world the stability of any one state can critically affect the stability of the international system as a whole. Failed sources can act as sources, incubators, and facilitators of a whole host of transnational security threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, organized crime, infectious diseases, and environmental destruction. The severity of threats posed by failed and destabilised states led the Bush administration to move up 'failed states' to the same level of threat posed by hostile states. Indeed the international community is extremely concerned about Pakistan's stability due to its radicalized anti-Western elements, its use of territory as a base for al-Qaeda, and a weak central government' s possession of launch codes for a whole arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) involves the planning and execution of illicit business ventures by networks or groups of individuals working in more than one country. Transnational organised criminal groups often use violence and corruption in order to meet their goals. Crimes can include money laundering, cyber-crime, human trafficking and smuggling, drugs, weapons, endangered species, body parts and nuclear material." TOC has over the last decade become a central security issue in western political economies, finding its way onto the agenda of key international for a including the United Nations, G7-8 elite industrial countries and the Council of Europe. This is mainly due to its capacity to weaken the financial and economic systems of countries and undermine democracy. In situations where weak governments are involved, they can find themselves up against these crime networks with out the institutional strength to counter them. While prospering in illegal activities these groups work against the peace and stability of nations internationally and often use bribery, terror, and violence to meet their goals."
Transnational terrorism has, since September 11, 2001, been considered one of the main (if not, the main by a number of Western countries) of the transnational security threats. Transnational terrorism is characterized by a non-state actor operating from one state and crossing borders to carry out terrorist attacks on another given state. Over the last decade there has been a marked increase in extremist Islamist terrorism operating from zones all across the world. Some commentators have questioned the high 'prioritization' of transnational terrorism due to the relatively little (when compared to other transnational security threats such as AIDS) of deaths associated with the phenomena. Indeed much of the international attention can be argued to have stemmed from the world's dominant power, the United States', interest and focus upon transnational terrorism as a major security threat. However this argument does not take into account a number of other issues. Perception has a fundamental role in security, and individual's beliefs that they are at risk from transnational terrorism has been arguably heightened in recent years. Moreover, whilst the deaths are relatively less than other transnational security issues, recent developments such as news that terrorists may have been experimenting with biological weapons demonstrates that the situation can change rapidly and lead to a greatly exacerbated threat.
Thursday, 02 April 2009
Adam
Written by Per Andersson, Research Associate, U K Defence Form
"Different perceptions of what is a threat are often the biggest obstacles to international cooperation. In fact, all of us are vulnerable to what we think of as dangers that threaten only other people" - Kofi Annan
INTRODUCTION
The concept of human security emerged in the mid 1990s but human-centric arguments have existed for far longer, championed by the political philosophy of liberalism. The purpose of this concept is to emphasise the desirable human conditions for people to be secure, focussing particularly on the nexus between development and conflict and the growing
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Friday, 13 March 2009
Adam
By Fred Burton and Scott Stewart
As anyone with a stock portfolio knows, it is a rough time for the markets. With many portfolios down 50 percent or more, this large loss of equity and wealth has been very difficult on individuals and corporations. The problems, of course, have not been confined to the stock markets. With property values plunging and variable-rate mortgages ballooning, many homeowners are also caught in a bad situation -- the number of homeowners behind in their mortgage payments has been increasing and the number of foreclosures has grown. Unemployment is also an issue. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in January 2009 there were 2,227 mass layoff actions in the United States involving 237,902 workers.
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Wednesday, 25 February 2009
Adam
Written by Simon Roberts
In December 2008, the President of the Council of the European Union released a report detailing the current European Security and Defence Policy. Here is the second part summarising the contents of the report.
Conflict Prevention
Efforts were pursued to improve the culture and strategy of conflict prevention. In this connection, the French Presidency of the EU, in close cooperation with the Secretariat of the Council, the EU Commission and the EPLO (European Peace-building Liaison Office), supported a seminar organised by the Madariga – College of Europe Foundation and the Folke Bernadotte
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Tuesday, 24 February 2009
Adam
Written by Simon Roberts
In December 2008, the President of the Council of the European Union released a report detailing the current European Security and Defence Policy. Here is the first of two parts summarising the contents of the report.
Operational activities
Africa
Somalia – EUNAVCO, established to combat piracy and protect maritime trade. Since October 2008, the action of EUNAVCO has facilitated the establishment of escort slots, to the benefit of many merchant and fishing vessels. Operation ATALANTA
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Friday, 24 September 2010
Robin Ashby
By Rachel Miller-Sprafke
The modern security environment presents an unprecedented challenge. Throughout history security requirements and the defence policies initiated therein have been subject to change, yet never before have the concepts themselves been so completely revolutionized. An unprecedented level of risk has compelled people of every stratum in society, from members of the public to those responsible for their defence, to do the impossible: to prepare for threats that have not yet materialized.
Previous changes in security and defence have not been conceptual, but practical. Technological developments and budget increases altered the potential of defensive policies. Political, economic, and social changes affected state relations, and therefore who and what was to be perceived as a security threat. What society faces now, however, is a complete revolution in the concept of security. It is an expansion necessitated by the increasing number of potential risks, which are no longer limited to traditional military notions of security. Threats are emerging from fields that were never previously included in the remit of defence, covering a spectrum from energy shortages to economic recession to climate change to global disease pandemic. The security sector is growing to include these new types of risks, but its expansion does not stop at these borders. Beyond these risks that are quantifiable lies the vast realm of the unknown. Here belong the dangers that have no name, where threats that do not yet exist lie in wait. The definition of security is evolving to include protection from the unpredictable, and thus defence policy must now do the seemingly impossible: to account for dangers that do not exist, to think the unthinkable.
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Tuesday, 28 September 2010
Robin Ashby
Dr Robert Crowcroft
We are all now accustomed to being assured that something called 'globalisation' has revolutionised the world over the last fifteen years or so, and is continuing to do so. Commentators, politicians and academics deploy the phrase willy-nilly, to frame an explanation for all manner of problems. 'Globalisation' is a catch-all. It seems sophisticated. People tell us that the phenomenon is changing everything, from the experiences of everyday life to the character of international politics itself. Trade, migration, and international organisations mean that the nation state system is weakening and being supplemented – or, according to some, even replaced – by a world of global governance, multinational companies and cross-border social movements. As a result, globalisation constitutes the most profound change to the Westphalian international system since its inception.
That all sounds very grand. Unfortunately, it isn't really true. It is a myth. More: it is a myth with a pernicious effect in misinforming and distorting public debate about contemporary international politics. Why is that? The theory of globalisation flows from an assumption that the key drivers of the international system are now non-state based entities and ideas. That could be the World Bank or it could be Burger King. And its advocates emphasise issues which generate a degree of international co-operation – like climate change, war crimes, economic crises and rogue regimes.
But the problem is that, when subjected to scrutiny, the evidence for such extensive co-operation doesn't really stack up. Still less does the co-operation that does occur constitute a systemic change in international relations. How much unanimity between nations has there really been on issues, like Iran, which present an obvious danger to much of the so-called 'global community'? Brokering agreement between separate polities remains as difficult as ever. Even the North Atlantic states, most menaced by Islamism, cannot agree between them on what to do and where. Remember Iraq. And for that matter observe Afghanistan, Lebanon and Pakistan today.
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Thursday, 30 September 2010
Robin Ashby
Globalisation tells us that the world is 'shrinking' and interdependence is increasing. I will deal with that claim in greater detail below, but for now the point must be made that all of this is based upon an assumption that there is, in the first place, a 'world' or a 'global' system that can be studied politically. In fact, that is a very big claim indeed. World politics is regional politics. The globe is divided into regions (North America, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, Central Asia, South Asia and East Asia) and sub-regions, and states pay minimal attention to things that happen elsewhere. Only the US is genuinely 'global' because of its military and economic presence. But how many educated Europeans know the name of the Japanese prime minister, or pay attention to Columbian politics? Who would invest Japan with greater significance than France, despite Japan being a much more important country? Very few. And who can really blame them? The problems of those areas remain remote.
David Miliband, when Foreign Secretary, announced that 'power is moving to a global level'. In truth, the idea that there even is a 'global level' is a fallacy. International institutions lack real power, and only have it when the states they consist of can agree to do something; more often than not they are paralysed by those states. The rulings of the United Nations Security Council are mostly gesture, lacking in bite. Anyway, the most effective international bodies – like NATO, the EU or the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation – are regional, not global. Rhetoric aside, regional politics are what matters. Since the Cold War, the major states have continued to negotiate with one another directly and solve problems between themselves, with the most powerful having the most influence. The collapse of the bi-polar framework saw more states become increasingly relevant. What that means, far from offering any support to globalisation, is that the traditional bases of international relations have been reinforced, not weakened.
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