

28th May: South Korea sends the findings of the international inquiry into the sinking of the Cheonan to China. Defence Minister Kim Tae-young also commented on conflicting government statements about the disappearance of two North Korean submarines from the South's radars around the time of the attack. At first the government said there was no connection with the sinking, but a later statement indicated that those were the submarines responsible for the attack on the Cheonan. Initially South Korea made a judgement based on its own intelligence data. However additional information was eventually obtained from the international investigation team.

1st June: North Korea's National Defence Commission held a press conference to discredit evidence that it was responsible for the attack on the Cheonan. For the South, the press conference confirmed that the members of the National Defence Commission had in the past been involved in previous inter-Korean meetings.

2nd June: The United States and South Korea announce that they will hold large-scale naval exercises in the Yellow Sea in a week's time. The drills were to show North Korea the 'firm combined defence posture' of Washington and Seoul. A South Korean defence official was quoted as saying that canons would be fired, anti-submarine bombs would be dropped and enemy communications would be intercepted "in a way similar to actual warfare."

3rd June: Seoul remained undecided over the sending of an official request for a UN resolution in response to the sinking of the Cheonan. According to sources at the UN, China's opposition to new sanctions against North Korea was keeping in check the South's desire to seek a UN resolution.

7th June: A two-star general was under investigation for leaking military secrets to North Korea. Amongst the information leaked was a document entitled OPLAN 5027. The document is believed to outline a joint U.S.-South Korean plan for the outbreak of war with the North. Information includes troop deployment plans, key North Korean targets and strategies for military control of facilities in the North.

8th June: An extraordinary session of North Korea's parliament resulted in a reshuffle of the regime's top leadership. A new premier was appointed and a key ally of Kim Jong-il was promoted to a senior military post. The KCNA news agency reported that Kim's brother-in-law, Jang Song Taek was promoted to vice chairman of the National Defence Commission, the most powerful organ of the Pyongyang regime. Analysts speculated that the appointment of Jang could be interpreted as a signal of Kim's determination to appoint his son Kim Jong-un as the next leader of North Korea.

11th June: An inquiry into the sinking of the Cheonan revealed that senior military figures distorted or concealed information in reporting the incident. The 2nd Naval Fleet Command was first informed by the captain of the Cheonan at 9:53 p.m. that the ship appeared to have

been hit by a torpedo. However it failed to pass this information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the headquarters of the Navy's operations command. The 2nd Naval Command also deliberately omitted that the captain made his report 31 minutes after the Cheonan began to sink at 9:22 p.m. This resulted in erroneous decisions in the early stages of the attack and prompted speculation that the Cheonan crashed into a reef or split in half due to metal fatigue.

The JCS also distorted crucial information when briefing to Defense Minister Kim Tae-young. Having been informed by the Navy's operations command that a sailor aboard the Cheonan had "heard an explosion," it omitted to mention this in its briefing. The JCS also told the defence minister that the ship sank at 9:45 p.m., even though it was told by the Navy operations command that it happened at 9:15 p.m. "Military officers deliberately left out or distorted key information in their report to senior officials and the public because they wanted to avoid being held to account for being unprepared," an official declared.

15th June: The South Korean defence chief reported that the North had raised its military readiness despite no visible signs of fresh provocation from Seoul. The U.N. Security Council also said late Monday that it was "gravely concerned" that the sinking of the Cheonan could endanger peace on the Korean peninsula. The UNSC also urged both parties to refrain from provocative acts. The statement came after the UNSC listened to separate presentations from each side, with Seoul seeking U.N. action to punish Pyongyang.

19th June: North Korea issues a no-sail warning off the west coast of the peninsula. Local newspapers speculated that the warning was declared in advance of a long-range missile launch and training exercises.

25th June: As the two Koreas marked the 60th anniversary of the outbreak of civil war, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak urged his Northern counterparts to cease 'reckless military provocation.' In his speech at anniversary conference Lee also reiterated calls for the North to admit its part in the sinking of the Cheonan.

27th June: North Korea said that it had rejected a proposals made by the American-led U.N. Command to hold military talks over the sinking of the Cheonan. The U.N. Command has launched its own investigation into the sinking. However North Korea said that the finding of their investigation would only mimic the South Korean-led international investigation. Pyongyang did offer to hold high-level military talks with the South on the condition that Seoul allowed North Korean officers to verify the investigation reports. South Korea was quick to reject these proposals.

28th June: The Korean Central News Agency issued a government statement declaring that continued U.S. hostility had raised the need for North Korea to improve its nuclear deterrent capabilities.

29th June: South Korea's Defence Ministry agreed to request \$25.8 billion in next year's budget. The amount represents almost a 7% increase on this year's budget and is expected to result in the purchase of new hardware and equipment. A Defence Ministry official indicated that the sinking of the Cheonan was reflected in the budget request, but refused to indicate which

weapons were under consideration for purchase.