Thinking the unthinkable: create Kurdistan, suggests David Hoghton-Carter, UK Defence Forum Research Associate

With the continuing advance of ISIS, both Syria and Iraq are destabilising further. Here in the West, there's an ongoing and significant debate about the efficacy of US-led intervention based primarily on air power, and with Turkey beginning to look to a military role, it's time to consider novel strategies. There's an approach which could contribute to debilitating ISIS and stabilising the region, and the thinking behind it. Put simply, it's time to for the Western allied nations to help create a recognised nation-state called Kurdistan.

Currently, the Kurdish Peshmerga are proving themselves to be the most effective opposition to ISIS on the ground. The Iraqi army, despite an extensive prior commitment from the US and her allies in equipment and training, has not been able to stand in the face of ISIS's advance. Furthermore, Kurdish autonomous authorities in northern Iraq have already shown that they can build and maintain good governance, with a much more open and progressive approach than many other regional governments.

In contrast, Iraq no longer exists as a coherent nation. To pretend otherwise is a delusion. The fault lines between Sunni and Shia now run too deep, and waves of conflict and repression since well before the fall of Saddam Hussein have put too much blood between the two communities. At some point, Iraq will be, and must be, formally divided if any peace is to last.

In Syria, we no longer recognise the Assad regime as legitimate. As a nation, it too has fragmented, and too much of it is effectively ungoverned. If Syrian Kurds can be supported to restore governance to a substantial area of the north of the country, and to provide an effective defence of people and communities, then that reduces the scope of ISIS to conduct operations. At this stage, the Assad regime need not even be consulted if the reality on the ground can be changed effectively. Once a Kurdish state has been created and internationally recognised, it would be folly for Assad to attack it, inviting full international intervention. And, when peace can be returned to Syria, this reduces the potential for further inter-ethnic tension to reignite a conflict.

Turkey is showing a willingness to look to a wider role in the region, to consider new strategies and approaches. It's previously worked well with the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq, and comments from within the AK Party indicate some openness to considering Kurdish independence. And with its neighbourhood now such a volatile region, its conflict with the Kurds should be the least of its concerns. Indeed, allowing its Kurdish region to secede and gain independence has clear benefits.

Firstly, this resolves its internal conflict at a stroke. And it does so, potentially, much more peacefully and cordially than would otherwise be the case. At worst, Turkey gains a buffer against ISIS and regional conflict contagion, a state too pre-occupied with defending its own southern border to confront an old enemy. At best, Turkey may be able to turn a long-term enemy into an ally. By making a new Kurdistan a strong strategic partner, Turkey can help consign old enmities to the past, as well as reinforcing its own regional defence. The course and character of diplomacy will be crucial in deciding which scenario plays out, and there will need to be multilateral talks hosted by a third party.

From the Western end, the essential carrot for Turkey must be a cast-iron guarantee of EU membership if it takes this step, with a firm timeline. The Kurdish problem has been an impediment to EU accession, and it may be hoped that resolving that problem might shake loose enough progress on other issues (including Cyprus, and different aspects of EU law) to make it a viable proposition. And, for Erdogan personally, there's potential to go down in history as a local peacemaker and a regional forward-thinker.

The next step, then, will be to ensure that the Peshmerga can step up their effectiveness further and become a fully mechanised, modern army. Not only must a new Kurdistan be able to defend itself, but it is potentially the essential ally and participant in any regional operation by Western allied forces against ISIS and any future ISIS successor movement. This has the fringe benefit of opening up a new market for Western defence companies. What is more, current evidence indicates that a new Kurdistan may be one of the few regional nations which can be reasonably relied upon to only use weapons provided or sold to it for purposes with align with international interests and which do not impact negatively on domestic human and civil rights.

Broad United Nations recognition would help to cement the legitimacy of a new Kurdistan, and getting Russia and China on board should be relatively straight-forward. There's potential for both nations to benefit from new trade relationships, and the emergence of Kurdistan can be framed in a way which gels with how current Russian and Chinese leaders view the intersection of geopolitics and sovereignty, provided Turkey is a willing and active participant in the process.

Helping Kurds to create a multi-province federal Kurdistan would likely ensure the greatest early stability, a smooth transition from the current patchwork of autonomous regions, semi-autonomous regions and ungoverned spaces to a coherent state. Current governance structures in place out of Arbil are solid enough, and can be translated into something deeper and more extensive with external support to ensure a new Kurdistan can get off to a good start on human rights.

All of this is not to say that great care is not required. Too many current problems in the Levant can be traced directly to post-imperial settlements, and diplomats must bear in mind the lessons of history. But it's achievable, and arguably the only way to successfully counteract ISIS without all the risks thrown up by putting brigades of infantry back into Iraq.