Rt Hon James Arbuthnot MP asks if the use of force is less acceptable in a democracy. 

General Sir Nicholas Houghton, Chief of Defence Staff, told the House of Commons Defence Committee in October 2013 that "The armed forces have never been held in higher respect by the nation, but perhaps the purposes towards which we have most recently been put have never been more deeply questioned."

This comment strikes me as being at the heart of the strategic communications challenge facing the military and more broadly reflects a challenge to the democratic legitimacy of maintaining Armed Forces to carry out the work that society wants them to do. The Defence Committee concluded in its preliminary report aiming to inform the 2015 Defence and Security Review that

"One of the greatest strategic threats to defence is the disconnect between the Armed Forces and the public caused by a lack of understanding of the utility of military force in the contemporary
strategic environment."

CDS was concerned that the armed forces were "the object of our nation's charity" and that this sympathy risked undermining public understanding of the utility of the Armed Forces. Whilst public support for the Armed Forces, and support for Armed Forces charities is welcome, and sympathy and support for bereaved service families and service men and women who suffer life-changing injuries is never to be taken for granted, there is a strategic danger that this sympathy may translate into actual hostility to what we use our Armed Forces for.

The Secretary of State for Defence admitted to the Defence Committee in November that "public appetite for expeditionary warfare is probably pretty low", as a consequence of the unpopular interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So one aspect of the legacy in the UK of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is the huge popularity of (and sympathy for) the Armed Forces running alongside reduced public support for foreign intervention.

The UK's intervention in Iraq was clearly controversial and had a profound effect on the public's attitude towards the UK engaging in military operations overseas.

However, operations in Afghanistan, certainly initially, inspired nothing like the same degree of hostility. But, as operations continued I would argue that the UK's experience demonstrates another challenge to the use of force in a democracy, and that is the impatience of modern democratic societies. Whilst my Committee has been critical of a lack of clarity and realism about objectives for operations, the question remains whether a more realistic approach to communicating progress would have made any difference. When we look to re-build a society that may be many decades behind our own in terms of social development, the rule of law and the maturity of democratic institutions, progress will be incremental and measured in decades. However, the public (and press) demand an instant return for the expenditure of blood and treasure.

A vigorous free media is a sine qua non of a democratic society, and it brings with it a healthy challenge to Government and those in authority. However, it also poses a challenge to Government and the Armed Forces in how they manage expectations of what can be achieved, and over what timescale, in military interventions.

The House of Commons vote on Syria in August last year revealed also a political scepticism about intervention and the utility of military force. Setting aside the merits or not of intervention in that particular case, I believe that much of the sentiment expressed in the House that day reflected a heightened awareness of the risks of intervention and a greater scepticism about the case made by Government than might have been evident 11 years before.

That vote of the House of Commons also set an interesting precedent for the UK, whereby the legislature effectively vetoed a proposal that simply held open the option of the use of military force by the executive. This is not a binding constitutional precedent. However, I suspect that it sets a strong political precedent that effectively raises the bar for future intervention overseas.

This evidence points to a deep public scepticism, certainly in the UK, about the utility of force in meeting threats to UK security. It also points to a deep scepticism within the political class about the utility of force and the case for future interventions.

In an age of continuing austerity this raises serious questions about long-term public support for spending on defence.

The Secretary of State told us that public attitudes to intervention and the use of military force could change very quickly – this may be so but capabilities that have been cut to pay for other, much needed, public services, cannot be restored so quickly.

Along with a free media, it goes without saying that the rule of law is another prerequisite of any democratic society. However, my Committee has recently conducted an inquiry into UK Armed
Forces personnel and the legal framework for future operations, which we published on 2 April 2014

The Committee concluded that International Humanitarian Law (IHL), also called the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), which was developed to regulate  armed conflict has largely stood the test of time. However, recent non-international conflicts, such as that in Iraq, have found a tension between IHL and human rights law which threatens the viability of future operations in two fundamental ways:

The extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights has allowed claims in the UK courts from foreign nationals. Detainees must be treated with humanity and respect. However, the requirement for full and detailed investigations of every death resulting from an armed conflict is putting an intolerable burden on the MoD and the Armed Forces, not just in resources spent but in the almost unlimited potential for retrospective claims against them.

There has been a failure of the accepted principle of combat immunity allowing families and military personnel to bring negligence cases against the MoD for injury or death. This seems to us to risk the judicialisation of war and to be incompatible with the accepted contract entered into by Service personnel and the nature of soldiering.

One of the unintended consequences of this development is that the use of force could lead to greater bloodshed. There is a real concern that a risk-averse commander, reluctant to send troops forward, may increasingly turn to using indirect support such as air strikes with greater consequent violence against the opposition and potentially more civilian deaths.  This would in turn make the use of force publicly less acceptable. My Committee has suggested some possible solutions to this challenge.

Is there any way that we can turn this situation around in terms of re-building genuine public understanding of the Armed Forces and public support for the utility of force? I suspect that, as the Secretary of State suggested, public attitudes to intervention can turn around very quickly.

We could do more to promote the success of military action in combating piracy off the Horn of Africa and the role of the military in humanitarian operations. There has been much discussion in the UK about the use of the military in the deployment of soft power, with an important role in upstream engagement and capacity building. This is a discussion, examining the broader dimensions of our security, inwhich I would like to see more public involvement.

I am also convinced that the military have "missed a trick" in the UK, by being perceived to have been slow off the mark in responding to the floods this winter in the south of England. The sight of Armed Forces personnel, bringing with them the logistical and command and control expertise for which they are renowned, is an enormously reassuring one for a public faced with natural disaster and immediate threats to their families and livelihoods. A very visible role for the Armed Forces in our recent floods would have done a great deal to address the "disconnect" between the public and the military.

The military has a very important role to play in building resilience in society to threats both from natural causes and hostile adversaries. This role has the potential to change perceptions of the role and utility of the Armed Forces.

Finally, I would note that public perceptions of security risk and of the role and relevance of the Armed Forces may be entering their most significant change since the end of the Cold War. Events in Crimea perhaps remind us of the need for the nations of Europe to continue to invest in their Armed Forces and to maintain awar-fighting capability. It remains to be seen how the current crisis in Ukraine unfolds and the impact that that has politically, and on public perceptions of the acceptability of the utility of force in safeguarding our security.