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We've been tracking developments in Iran's Nuclear & Missile Programmes for nearly 20 years. Here's the latest, where diligent work by researchers has been replaced by ChatPGT. Sources include ft.com, trtglobal, en.wikipedia.org, thenationalnews.com. apnews,com, global-worldscope.blogspot.com, iranprimer.com, ginc.org, thetimes.co.uk, iranwatch.org, commonslibrary.parliament.uk, iaes.org, reddit.com, landfonline.com, time.com, nypost.com
2020
Apr 22 – IRGC launches its first satellite, signaling growing indigenous space & dual-use capabilities
Jun 19 – IAEA urges Iran to comply with safeguards and restore full verification access
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Jul – Explosion at Natanz centrifuge plant (blamed on sabotage); UN arms embargo expires under the JCPOA .
2021
Jan 4 – Iran begins enriching uranium to 20% at Fordow .
Feb – Installation of IR-2M centrifuges at Natanz; begins uranium-metal research
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Apr 6–16 – Nuclear talks resume in Vienna (U.S. indirectly); Iran enriches to 60% purity—the first breach of weapon-grade threshold
.Dec – IAEA installs cameras in part, but monitoring remains disrupted
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2022
Mar–Jun – Vienna talks stall; Iran ploughs ahead with IR-6 centrifuge installation and surveillance rollbacks
Jun - IRGC announces successful tests of a new hypersonic missile (Fattah); unveiled June 2023
Nov 17 – IAEA censures Iran for non-cooperation, removing cameras
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2023
May 3 – Iran nearing weapons-grade enrichment (~84%), but not confirmed as weaponizing
May 6 – IAEA notes uranium at 83.7% at sites; still not declared non-weapons
June 6 – Official unveiling of Fattah-1 hypersonic MRBM (~1,400 km range, Mach 13)
August – IAEA reports Fordow operating IR-6/IR-2M cascades at 60%, multiplying enrichment output
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2024
Apr–Oct – Iran reportedly uses Fattah-1 missiles and Kheibar-Shekan MRBMs (~1,450 km) in regional launches
Dec – IAEA confirms enrichment at Fordow up to 60%, warning output may climb to ~34 kg/month
2025
Nuclear Programme
Apr 12–Jun 13 – U.S.–Iran indirect talks held in Oman, Rome, Muscat on possible return to JCPOA
June 12 – IAEA Board rules Iran non-compliant with nuclear safeguards; notes highly enriched U stockpile for ~9 bombs
June 13 – Israel begins airstrikes on Natanz, Fordow, Arak reactor; Iran responds with missile launches
Missile Programme
May 4–5 – Iran unveils Qassem Bassir MRBM (~1,200 km) with improved guidance and solid-fuel propulsion
.Jun 13–18 – Iran reportedly launches Fattah-1 missiles (claimed hypersonic) at Israel during conflict .
Key Nuclear Agreements and Declarations (2020–2025)
JCPOA remains technically active until October 2025 despite U.S. withdrawal and Iran's violations — UNSCR 2231 governs sanctions
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2020–2021 – Iran withdraws from voluntary commitments, restricts IAEA monitoring (cameras, seals) .
Vienna Talks (2021–2022) – Attempts to revive JCPOA stall amid sanctions and inspection disputes
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2025 talks – U.S.–Iran indirect diplomacy resumes, but ends amid conflict and air attacks
IAEA Board resolution June 2025 – Marks first finding of non-compliance in two decades
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Summary of Recent Trends
Nuclear: Rapid enrichment to 60–84%; stockpiles at levels supporting weapons-grade material within weeks; key facilities partly off-limits to inspectors.
Missiles: Notable modernization with solid-fuel MRBMs (Qassem Bassir, Kheibar Shekan); hypersonic claims (Fattah-1); advances in guidance and maneuverability.
Diplomacy: Talks have ebbed and flowed with periods of progress and collapse; JCPOA framework remains intact despite violations; 2025 negotiations overtaken by military action.
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