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Development Initiatives, a UK-based research group that provides impartial information relating to aid, has released its annual Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA) report on international contributions to Afghanistan. Based on data from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Afghanistan Donor Assistance Database (DAD) and the group's own research, the report identifies resource trends between 2002 and 2010 and 'critical gaps' in our knowledge of tracking resources. The report also contains several surprising facts regarding official development assistance (ODA).

According to the report, since late 2001, Afghanistan has received $286.4 billion in resources from foreign donors. Of this, 84.6% was spent directly on foreign military operations by NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and by America's Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), 5.6% was spent on security-related (non-ODA eligible) aid, and the remaining 9.4% was spent on ODA.

Military-related funding

Between 2002 and 2010, spending has risen in all three categories. The costs of US-led OEF and the NATO-led ISAF increased from $16.8 billion in 2002 to $63.1 billion in 2009, rising every year except 2004. In 2009, military spending totalled more than ten times the level of non-military international aid.

Security funding

Security contributions for training and equipping the Afghan Army and police and for counter-narcotics activities correlate strongly with rises in military spending. The report notes, however, that the recorded total of $16.1 billion is only a 'limited' selection of funds and that real costs of building the security sector in Afghanistan 'are extremely difficult to trace' and remain 'largely untracked.'

International Aid

Before 2004, Afghanistan was the 69th largest recipient of ODA worldwide. But between 2004 and 2007, Afghanistan had become the 2nd largest recipient of ODA, trailing only Iraq. In 2008, Afghanistan received the largest amount of ODA and had become America's highest strategic priority, as well as the ISAF's largest global peacekeeping operation. In the short time since 2008, the gap between the first and second-highest aid recipients has widened considerably. In 2008, Afghanistan received $1.5 billion more than Ethiopia; by the following year, the gap had widened to $2.2 billion.

Despite receiving the most aid from donor governments reporting to the OECD DAC, levels of aid given to Afghanistan remain lower than those given to conflict-ridden countries in the past. On a per capita basis, it has received less aid per person than Iraq and Bosnia. At its peak, Afghanistan received US $172 per person, compared to Iraq's peak of US $315 and Bosnia's peak of US $369 per person.

The report also reveals some changes in the categories of aid that Afghanistan receives. Donors have shifted funding away from humanitarian aid towards sector-allocable aid, which is aimed mainly at government and civil society programmes, as well as other social and economic services. Humanitarian aid dropped steadily between 2002 and 2007. It rose sharply in 2008 after a spike in food shortages and insecurity, but fell again in 2009 despite an increase in total aid. At its peak in 2002, Afghans received $39.60 per person in humanitarian aid, compared to Iraqis who received $44.30 in 2003, Somalis who received $63.20 in 2008 and Palestinians who received $284.90 in 2009.

Fluctuations in the contributions from donor governments could account for these shifts in aid. Between 2002 and 2009, the United States provided 40.9% of the total, whereas the four other leading donors (EU Institutions, the UK, Germany and Canada) provided a combined 24%. In 2009, the United States increased its contribution to 48.7% of the total. Like other donors, it has recently taken greater control over how its contributions are spent. 'Preferencing', a process whereby donors can state a preference for how up to half of their contributions are spent, was used on 6.2% of the total aid in 2003, compared to 45.7% in 2009. This trend has had an impact on funds like the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), which has been gradually losing its proportion of total aid.

Challenges Ahead

Despite spending increases in all three categories, huge security and development challenges persist. A stronger Afghan army and police force, as well as greater international troop numbers, have so far failed to increase the safety of Afghan civilians. Data from the UN assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) reveals a record number of deaths from January to June in 2010. In the same year, there were also an unprecedented number of security incidents involving foreign and national aid workers.

Afghanistan is also 'off track' in eradicating extreme poverty. The UN estimates that 7.8 million people will require food aid in 2011. Humanitarian aid has also been strained by an influx of five million former refugees since 2002, which has increased the population by roughly 20 percent. Afghanistan also remains the world's largest producer of opium. Since the toppling of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, proceeds from its cultivation have funded the activities of insurgents, criminals, and terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The full GHA report can be accessed here.


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